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Abstract  
When facing sacrificial dilemmas in which harm maximizes outcomes, people appear sensitive 
to three moral principles: They are more averse to actively causing harm than passively allowing 
it (action principle), more averse to causing harm directly than indirectly (contact principle), and 
more averse to causing harm as a means than as a by-product of helping others (intention 
principle). Across five studies and a meta-analysis (N = 1218), we examined whether individual 
differences in people’s sensitivity to these principles were related to participants’ moral 
preferences on sacrificial dilemmas. Interestingly, sensitivity to each of these principles was 
related to both elevated harm-rejection (i.e., deontological) as well as elevated outcome 
maximization (i.e., utilitarian) response tendencies. Rather than increasing responses consistent 
with only one philosophical position, people sensitive to moral principles balanced moral 
concerns about causing harm and maximizing outcomes, similar to people high in other measures 
of moral concern. 
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In an oft-quoted passage of his Critique of Practical Reason, the German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant confessed his everlasting admiration for both “the starry heavens above and the 
moral law within” (p. 1, Guyer, 1992). Kant was touched, not just by the distant glimmer of 
faraway celestial bodies, but by the strict mathematical laws guiding their movement. Inspired by 
Newton’s success in reducing the complexity of nature into a set of clearly defined physical 
principles, Kant aimed to undertake a similar project for morality. However, despite Kant’s best 
efforts, the principles of normative ethics remain the subject of great philosophical debate. While 
empirical work cannot address which principles are normatively correct (Ayer, 1936; Gowans, 
2016), such research does demonstrate that laypeople are, in fact, sensitive to certain moral 
principles.  
For instance, people judge directly causing harm as worse than passively allowing the 
same harm to occur, a principle known as the action principle (Spranca et al., 1991; Baron & 
Ritov, 2004; Bostyn & Roets, 2016). Additionally, people think it is more reprehensible to harm 
someone as a means towards achieving a goal than to inflict the same harm as a side-effect of 
achieving the same goal, referred to as the intention principle (or doctrine of double effect, Foot, 
1967; Royzman & Baron, 2002; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007). Finally, the contact principle 
suggests that harms enacted through direct physical contact are more blameworthy than harms 
enacted indirectly (Cushman, 2013; Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2009). While people 
are, on average, sensitive to these principles, there remains considerable variation across 
individuals. So why do some people channel their inner Kantian whereas others do not?  
One possibility is that sensitivity to these principles is related to the type of moral 
judgments that participants favor more generally. Considerable research investigates responses to 
sacrificial dilemmas where harming a focal target minimizes total overall harm (e.g., Greene et 
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al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004; Kahane, et al., 2015; Conway, et al., 2018).1 A prime example of 
these dilemmas, the trolley dilemma, describes a runaway trolley that is about to kill five 
innocent bystanders and asks participants to judge the appropriateness of sacrificing another 
bystander instead. Typically, harm rejection decisions are described as deontological, as they are 
broadly consistent with philosophical positions advocating absolute prohibitions against causing 
harm (Kant, 1785/1959). Conversely, harm-acceptance decisions that maximize outcomes are 
described as utilitarian, as they are broadly consistent with philosophical positions advocating a 
focus on outcomes (e.g., Mill, 1861/1998). Interestingly, whereas principled moral reasoning is 
foundational to deontological approaches to morality, utilitarian philosophy explicitly rejects the 
moral importance of such factors. Accordingly, one can wonder whether principled people 
prioritize a particular response to sacrificial dilemmas, or whether sensitivity to principles 
elevates multiple moral considerations, suggesting a ‘deep engagement’ with the moral issue 
instead.  
Past work examining moral principledness has largely focused on self-reports of 
adherence to deontological or utilitarian principles. Such work shows that people who endorse 
deontological principles tend to reject sacrificial harm (Robinson et al., 2015; Piazza & Landy, 
2013), whereas people who endorse utilitarian principles tend to accept sacrificial harm (Conway 
et al., 2018; Kahane et al., 2018; Piazza & Sousa, 2014). However, effect sizes are small, as 
people often decide differently than their self-reports may suggest. As a result, this research 
shows that dilemma decisions reflect a multiplicity of processes rather than an explicit adherence 
to philosophical ideals. To what extent it is useful to label harm-rejection or outcome-
 
1 Some theorists argue for expanding dilemma work to actions that prevent harm to a focal target at a cost to a 
broader group (e.g., Crone & Laham, 2017; Gawronski et al., 2017). As such focal actions entail a different 
psychology than harmful actions (Cushman et al., 2012), we focus here on harmful actions that maximize outcomes.  
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maximizing judgments as ‘deontological’ or ‘utilitarian’ is a matter of active debate (Kahane et 
al., 2015, 2018; Conway et al., 2018). 
In contrast to prior research, we examine principledness by investigating how individual 
differences in sensitivity to the action, intention, and contact principles relate to sacrificial 
decisions. Furthermore, we do this by using ‘process dissociation’, a technique allowing for 
independently assessing harm rejection (i.e. deontological) and outcome-maximization (i.e. 
utilitarian) response tendencies (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). This procedure allows us to 
investigate whether people who are more sensitive to these specific principles demonstrate 
increases in harm-rejection responses tendencies, decreases in outcome-maximization responses 
tendencies, or increases in both response tendencies. 
 
Principledness and Dilemma Decision-making 
Some authors have argued that people sensitive to moral principles, such as the action 
principle, are making an inherently deontological distinction focused on the harmful action itself 
(e.g., Baron & Goodwin, 2020; Bennis et al., 2010; cf. Gawronski et al., 2020). Indeed, perhaps 
the most well-known of deontological principles: “first, do no harm” directly relates to the action 
principle. This perspective might suggest that people sensitive to moral principles may show 
increased deontological responding—i.e., rejecting sacrificial harm regardless of what positive 
outcomes may result. Such findings align with past work suggesting that deontological 
responding partially reflects adherence to absolute rules, such as inviolable divine commands 
(Bartels, 2008; Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Piazza & Landy, 2013; Robinson et al., 2015).  
A complimentary possibility is that sensitivity to principles is related to reduced 
utilitarian responding. The three principles are deontological distinctions regarding the nature of 
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harmful action, and utilitarian philosophy explicitly rejects the moral importance of such factors 
(Mill, 1861/1998). Therefore, participants inclined towards outcome-focused, consequentialist 
judgments might demonstrate reduced sensitivity to moral principles. If so, there should be a 
negative relationship between sensitivity to principles and utilitarian responding. 
It is worth pointing out that methodologically, these first two hypotheses are 
indistinguishable using conventional analyses that treat deontological responding as the direct 
opposite of utilitarian responding: Both hypotheses suggest that sensitivity to principles would be 
associated with reduced acceptance of outcome-maximizing harm. However, process 
dissociation analyses independently assess harm-rejection responding (deontology parameter) 
and outcome-maximization responding (utilitarian parameter, Conway & Gawronski, 2013). 
Hence, process dissociation can test both hypotheses simultaneously: whether sensitivity to 
principles predicts a) increased deontological, and/or b) reduced utilitarian responding. 
Moreover, process dissociation allows for testing a third hypothesis: sensitivity to 
principles might predict both increased deontological and increased utilitarian responding. While 
such a hypothesis might appear counter-intuitive, consider work that suggests careful 
deliberative processing increases utilitarian responding (e.g., Byrd & Conway, 2019; Patil et al., 
2020; but see also Bostyn et al, 2020). Sensitivity to a moral principle requires the appraisal that 
that specific principle is relevant to the situation (Nichols & Mallon, 2006). Crucially, the action, 
intention, and contact principles are subtle distinctions some people fail to recognize (Cushman 
et al., 2006; Baron & Goodwin, 2020). People who take the time to carefully deliberate on moral 
issues may be more skilled at detecting when these distinctions are relevant, and might also 
display increased sensitivity to these principles.  
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Furthermore, a growing body of work demonstrates that people especially concerned 
about morality score high on both the deontological and utilitarian parameters. For example, 
people higher in moral identity internalization, which reflects an increased concern for morality 
at the core of their self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002), score high on both parameters, as do 
people who report high moral conviction against harm (Conway et al., 2018), strong emotional 
aversion to witnessing others suffer (Reynolds & Conway, 2018), and stable childhoods allowing 
development of deeper emotional concern for others (Maranges et al., 2020). Hence, people high 
in moral concern demonstrate deep engagement with and conflict over sacrificial dilemmas, 
similar to people situationally induced to distrust their initial snap judgment (Conway, Weiss, et 
al., 2018; Muda et al., 2018; Mata, 2019). Sensitivity to moral principles may operate similarly 
to these other measures of moral concern, demonstrating associations with both increased 
deontological and utilitarian responding suggestive of deep engagement with dilemmas. 
Note that associative patterns such as these, i.e. scoring high on both deontological and 
utilitarian parameters, can lead to suppression effects. If a variable positively relates to both 
harm rejection and outcome maximization, the underlying associative patterns will not emerge 
on a conventional dilemma analysis that treats aversion to harm and maximizing outcomes as 
opposites because these effects will largely cancel each other out. This is because people who 
care deeply about both avoiding harm and maximizing outcomes must ultimately arrive at a 
decision, same as people who care little about either.  
Accordingly, if Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, or both are correct, then decision sensitivity 
to moral principles should emerge for both a conventional dilemma analysis (i.e., fewer 
sacrificial judgments) and process dissociation analysis (i.e., increased deontology parameter, 
reduced utilitarian parameter, or both). However, if instead Hypothesis 3 is correct (i.e., people 
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sensitive to moral principles show both increased deontological and increased utilitarian 
responding), then this pattern could result in suppression, largely canceling out for conventional 
analyses that treat harm rejection and outcome maximization as opposites. Process dissociation, 
however, would still be able to separate and hence detect both effects as increases on both 
parameters. 
The Present Research 
 We conducted five studies assessing individual differences in decision sensitivity to the 
action, intention, and contact principles and related these to utilitarian and deontological 
responding as assessed via process dissociation. Instead of reporting each study individually, we 
provide the individual results within a comprehensive meta-analysis of all studies. We report all 
studies collected, all data exclusions and all measures and manipulations used in these studies. 
The data, materials, detailed results, and statistical code for all studies are available through open 
science framework (https://osf.io/qxztn/?view_only=180112fb81ec41c2bbb300bdfdd2698b). 
Studies 1 to 4 were not preregistered, but we preregistered Study 5 at https://osf.io/h29qj/. 
Method 
Participants 
For Study 1, we recruited volunteers through social media from the general population of 
[European country]. For Studies 2-5, we recruited North-American participants through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We paid participants US$1.20 for Studies 2 and 4, US$0.70 for 
Study 3, and US$1.50 for Study 5.2 We conducted all studies online through inhouse survey 
software (Studies 1-4) or Qualtrics (Study 5). Participants were barred from completing a study 
 
2 Some of these studies were conducted before we were aware of issues involving fair payment of online data-
collection and regrettably, this means the payment for some of these studies might have fallen short of meeting the 
standard of minimum federal wage of U.S. $7.25. 
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if they participated previously or duplicated the IP address of a previous participant. We only 
recruited participants with an HIT approval > 95% but did not require a minimum number of 
prior HITs. Additionally, for Study 5 we blocked suspicious geocodes, and used CloudResearch 
to verify worker location and block low quality participants. No participants were excluded from 
Studies 1-4. Study 5 contained an attention check that required checking a specific multiple 
choice answer and copying “I read the instructions” to a text box. Participants that failed this 
check (n = 22) were eliminated from the sample. 
Basic demographic statistics and sample sizes for each study are available in Table 1. 
One participant in Study 1 self-reported an age of 2 which was recoded to missing. We did not 
collect any data on the racial composition of our samples in Studies 1 to 4. In Study 5, 75% of 
participants identified as White, 9% identified as Asian, 7% identified as Black, 6% identified as 
Hispanic, 2% identified as Multi-racial and <1% of participants identified as American Indian or 
Alaskan Native. 
We conducted an internal meta-analysis of all five studies, but not all studies contained 
all measures (See table 2). A power sensitivity analysis suggests the meta-analytic test associated 
with the smallest sample (i.e. the correlation between sensitivity to principles and process 
dissociation parameters; N = 1076) had ~80% power to detect an effect of r ≥ .11, assuming 
moderate between-study heterogeneity (Borenstein et al., 2011; Valentine et al., 2010).  
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Table 1 
Sample size and summary demographical statistics 
 N (Female, Male, Other) Mean Age (SD)  
Study 1 120 (76, 44, 0) 33.52 (15.6)  
Study 2 199 (96, 103, 0) 35.48 (9.6)  
Study 3 200 (96, 104, 0) 35.27 (10.9)  
Study 4 197 (87, 110, 0) 35.82 (11.6)  
Study 5 480 (216, 262, 2) 39.47 (11.8)  
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Procedure  
We used a similar procedure throughout all studies, albeit with minor differences. In all 
studies, participants were first asked to complete demographic information (age and gender, plus 
racial background in Study 5). In Study 1, we then measured decision sensitivity to the three 
moral principles on a randomized battery of eight sacrificial dilemmas. Each dilemma entailed 
asking participants how morally appropriate it was to sacrifice a single bystander to save five 
others, but differed on whether this choice entailed completing an action or refraining from an 
action (i.e. action principle), whether sacrificing the bystander served as a means towards saving 
the others or was a side-effect of saving the others (i.e. intention principle), and finally, whether 
direct or indirect harmful contact was involved (i.e. contact principle). Then, participants 
completed a randomized battery of six different sacrificial dilemmas where causing harm 
maximizes outcomes (Bostyn et al., 2016). This battery allows for a conventional dilemma 
analysis. Finally, participants reported whether they explicitly endorsed the three moral 
principles. 
In Study 2, participants first completed a randomized 20-item sacrificial dilemma battery, 
with 10 congruent and incongruent variants, allowing for both a conventional and process 
dissociation analysis (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Participants then completed the 8 dilemmas 
from Study 1 to measure decision sensitivity to moral principles. Finally, participants completed 
two additional trait measures: Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 
1984) and Need to Belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Study 2 did not include a measure of 
explicit agreement with principles.  
In Studies 3, 4 and 5 participants again completed the process dissociation battery and 
moral principle decision sensitivity battery (cf. Study 2), and participants also reported explicit 
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endorsement of each moral principle. In Studies 3 and 4, participants also completed the 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (Epstein et al., 1996). The REI combines a measure of Need for 
Cognition with a measure for Experiential Thinking. Study 5 did not contain any trait measures 
but did additionally ask participants whether they had encountered trolley-like dilemmas before.3 
Full results for the trait measures and the measure of explicit approval are available in the 
supplementary materials.4 An overview of which measures were included in which study is 
available in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Measures included in each experiment. 
 Study1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 
Traditional Dilemmas      
Process Dissociation Dilemmas      
Sensitivity to Principles      
Additional Measures:       
Explicit Approval      
Need for Cognition      
Need to Belong      




3 Results are similar for both groups, a more complete analysis is available in the supplementary materials. 
4 Neither Need to Belong nor Experiential thinking were associated with usage of any moral distinction (all |r| < .07, 
p > .095). Need for Cognition was associated with increased sensitivity to the action principle rmeta =.08, p = .033, 
increased sensitivity to the intention principle, rmeta = .12, p = .02 but not with sensitivity to the contact principle, 
rmeta = -.01, p = .401. Explicit approval of a moral principle correlated with sensitivity to that principle in the case of 
the action principle, rmeta = .11, p = .018, and the contact principle, rmeta = .11, p = .004, but not in the case of the 
intention principle, rmeta = .03, p = .201.  
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Decision sensitivity to moral principles. Participants responded to eight variants of the 
trolley dilemma. Each dilemma involved the tradeoff of sacrificing one life to save five lives, 
and participants indicated to what extent they deemed this sacrifice to be morally appropriate on 
7-point scales from (1) completely inappropriate to (7) completely appropriate in Study 1, and 5-
point scales from (1) completely inappropriate to (5) completely appropriate in Studies 2-5.5 
Using a 2×2×2 within-subjects design, each participant considered eight dilemmas comprising 
all possible combinations of the three distinctions in a randomized fashion. In four dilemmas 
sacrificing the single bystander required an action; in the other four, it required inaction. In four 
dilemmas the sacrifice required using the single person as the means of saving the five; in the 
other four, the sacrifice was only a side-effect. Finally, in four dilemmas the sacrifice 
necessitated direct physical contact; in the other four, it did not. As an example: the 
“Action/Means/Contact” dilemma read as follows: 
“A runaway trolley-train is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be 
killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in 
between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge stands 
another workman. The only way to save the lives of all five workmen is by pushing this other 
workman off the bridge onto the tracks where his body will sufficiently slow down the trolley so 
all five workmen can be safely evacuated. If you do this, the one workman will die but the five 
others will be saved. How morally appropriate is it to sacrifice the one workman to save the 
five?” 
Whereas, the “Inaction/Means/Contact” dilemma read: 
 
5 In Study 1, participants also rated how appropriate they considered it to not sacrifice the single bystander (as per 
Bostyn et al., 2018). Because the results from this measure mirrored those reported in the main text, we simplified 
our procedure for all subsequent studies. These results are available in the online supplementary materials. 
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“A single workman is stuck between the rails of a railroad track. You grab his hand and 
are about to free the man when you notice a runaway trolley-train headed towards the stuck 
workman, and some distance away, five other workmen. The only way to save the lives of the 
other five workmen is to not free the single workman so his body will sufficiently slow down the 
trolley so all five workmen can be safely evacuated. If you do this, the one workman will die but 
the five others will be saved. How morally appropriate is it to sacrifice the one workman to save 
the five?” 
Conventional and process dissociation dilemma batteries. In the first study, 
participants considered six sacrificial moral dilemmas (Bostyn et al., 2016) and indicated 
whether they considered the sacrificial harm to be either morally appropriate or inappropriate in 
a binary fashion (yes/no). This battery allows for a conventional analysis only. In Studies 2 to 5, 
we employed process dissociation. Process dissociation also allows for a conventional analysis 
directly comparable to Study 1, so we ran a) the conventional analysis for all five studies, and b) 
a process dissociation analysis on Studies 2-5.  
Computing process dissociation parameters requires participants to respond to two types 
of sacrificial dilemmas: congruent and incongruent. Incongruent dilemmas entail causing harm 
to maximize overall outcomes (e.g. killing a baby to save the lives of many villagers). Similar to 
traditional trolley-style dilemmas, concerns about avoiding harm and maximizing outcomes are 
incongruent. Congruent dilemmas involve the same scenario and sacrificial harm, but the 
positive benefits from inflicting harm are diluted so they are harder to justify on utilitarian 
grounds (killing a baby to save the same villagers from hard labor). For each harmful action with 
a specified outcome, participants selected either Yes, this is appropriate, or No, this is not 
appropriate. By computing acceptance and rejection of sacrificial harm for each dilemma for 
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each participant, and applying the formulae described by Conway and Gawronski (2013), we 
calculated the degree to which each participant rejected sacrificial harm across all scenarios 
regardless of outcomes (deontology parameter), and the degree to which they accepted harm 
when doing so maximizes outcomes whilst rejecting harm when it does not (utilitarian 
parameter). A full explanation of process dissociation calculations is available through the online 
supplementary materials.  
Results 
Decision Sensitivity to Moral Principles 
 First, we measured whether decisions on the 8-dilemma principle battery varied in line 
with each principle—i.e., whether participants’ judgments demonstrated the action, intention, 
and contact principles. To compute the action principle sensitivity score, we averaged sacrificial 
acceptance ratings for inaction dilemmas and subtracted average acceptance ratings from action 
dilemmas. Higher scores denote increased sensitivity to the principle. We used a similar 
procedure to compute sensitivity to the intention and contact principles. Overall, participants 
showed significant sensitivity to all three moral principles. Across all studies, they were more 
likely to consider sacrificial harm inappropriate when harm resulted from actions, served as a 
means towards a goal, or was accomplished through physical contact, consistent with past work 
(see Table 2; Cushman et al., 2006; Feltz & May, 2017; Jamison et al., 2020).  




Mean and standard deviations of decision sensitivity to each moral principle for all studies. 
Sensitivity to principles was computed as a difference score based on measures with a 7-point 
scale in Study 1 and  a 5-point scale in Studies 2–5.  
 
Action Principle 
 Mean (SD) t p Cohen’s D (95% CI) 
Study 1 (N = 120) 0.67 (0.90) 8.11 <.001 0.74 (0.58, 0.92) 
Study 2 (N = 199) 0.30 (0.60) 7.05 <.001 0.50 (0.38, 0.62) 
Study 3 (N = 200) 0.24 (0.56) 5.98 <.001 0.42 (0.30, 0.56) 
Study 4 (N = 197) 0.27 (0.66) 5.70 <.001 0.41 (0.29, 0.54) 
Study 5 (N = 480) 0.18 (0.54) 7.42 <.001 0.34 (0.25, 0.43) 
Meta:    0.43 (0.27, 0.59) 
Intention Principle 
Study 1 (N = 120) 0.58 (0.76) 8.45 <.001 0.77 (0.60, 0.98) 
Study 2 (N = 199) 0.18 (0.52) 4.91 <.001 0.35 (0.22, 0.48) 
Study 3 (N = 200) 0.13 (0.48) 3.73 <.001 0.26 (0.13, 0.39) 
Study 4 (N = 197) 0.18 (0.56) 4.60 <.001 0.33 (0.20, 0.44) 
Study 5 (N = 480) 0.13 (0.50) 5.86 <.001 0.27 (0.18, 0.36) 
Meta:    0.34 (0.14, 0.54) 
Contact Principle 
Study 1 (N = 120) 0.96 (1.06) 9.95 <.001 0.91 (0.75, 1.08) 
Study 2 (N = 199) 0.30 (0.57) 7.46 <.001 0.53 (0.42, 0.64) 
Study 3 (N = 200) 0.32 (0.58) 7.91 <.001 0.56 (0.45, 0.68) 
Study 4 (N = 197) 0.28 (0.56) 7.07 <.001 0.50 (0.37, 0.64) 
Study 5 (N = 480) 0.22 (0.58) 8.48 <.001 0.39 (0.30, 0.48) 
Meta:    0.51 (0.30, 0.72) 
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Conventional Dilemma Analyses 
 Next, to examine whether individual differences in sensitivity to each principle predicted 
responses on sacrificial dilemmas, we calculated the correlations between these measures in each 
study and combined them in a meta-analysis with the metacor package in R (Laliberté, 2011) 
using a DerSimonian-Laird approach (see Figure 1). For conventional analyses that treat 
deontological and utilitarian concerns as opposites, we uncovered some evidence that increased 
sensitivity to the action principle was related to reduced utilitarian dilemma responses, rmeta = -. 
07, p = .012, but no evidence for an association between sensitivity to the intention or contact 
principles and utilitarian dilemma responses, both |rmeta| ≤ 0.01, both ps > .475. However, as 
discussed above, such analyses are vulnerable to suppression effects: sensitivity to moral 
principles may predict increased deontological and increased utilitarian responding. If so, then 
we should expect suppression to result in low correlations with conventional analyses, similar to 
other studies (e.g., Maranges et al., 2020).  
 
Process Dissociation Analyses 
 We calculated the correlation between sensitivity to each principle with the deontology 
and utilitarian PD parameters for Studies 2-5, and combined these results into a meta-analysis 
(see Figure 1). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, results showed that for each moral principle, 
sensitivity to that principle significantly predicted both higher deontological responding, all rmeta 
> .12, p ≤ .001, and higher utilitarian responding, all rmeta > .15, p ≤ .001. People sensitive to the 
action, intention, and/or contact principles tended to both reject sacrificial harm and maximize 
overall outcomes, once these response tendencies were disentangled. Although results were not 
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always significant within each individual study, overall, the pattern was similar across all 
principles and studies. Notably, this pattern replicated in preregistered Study 5.   
 
Figure 1. Meta-analytic correlations across all five studies for sensitivity to principles and moral 
judgments (upper panel: conventional analysis, lower panel: process dissociation analysis).  
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General Discussion 
We investigated how individual differences in sensitivity to the action, intention, and 
contact principles relate to responses on sacrificial dilemmas. Overall, participants’ decisions 
were clearly sensitive to each principle. These results thereby constitute a robust replication of 
earlier research in this area (Baron & Ritov, 2004; Cushman et al, 2006; Cheng, 2020; Feltz & 
May, 2017; Jamison et al., 2020). Yet, not everyone was equally sensitive to each principle. We 
then examined how individual differences in sensitivity to these principles relate to responses on 
subsequent sacrificial dilemmas using conventional (Studies 1-5) and process dissociation 
analyses (Studies 2-5). 
Conventional analyses revealed only a single small effect: When concerns about rejecting 
harm were pitted against concerns about maximizing outcomes, a negative correlation emerged 
between sacrificial acceptance and sensitivity to the action principle (only). Conclusions based 
on this conventional analysis might therefore suggest that sensitivity to moral principles is 
largely unrelated to increased deontological responding (Hypothesis 1), reduced utilitarian 
responding (Hypothesis 2), or increased utilitarian and deontological responding (Hypothesis 3). 
However, conventional analyses can be misleading in cases of suppression. By independently 
assessing the degree to which each participant rejects sacrificial harm regardless of outcomes 
(deontological parameter), and accepts harm that maximizes outcomes (utilitarian parameter), 
process dissociation (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) allows for a more fine-grained analysis.   
Importantly, the process dissociation analysis supported Hypothesis 3: participants more 
sensitive to the action, intention, or contact principle scored higher on both the deontology and 
utilitarian parameters. In other words, participants that paid careful attention to morally relevant 
factors pertaining to action, intention, and contact, strove to balance harm rejection and outcome-
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maximization. This pattern also explains the results for conventional measures: both positive 
associations counteracted one another, either washing out the overall effect (i.e., suppression), or 
resulting in a small negative one.  
 
Principled deontologists and principled utilitarians 
To our knowledge, the current work is the first to explore individual differences in 
sensitivity to the action, intention, and contact principles. Participants sensitive to each principle 
demonstrated both a heightened aversion to causing harm and a heightened desire to maximize 
outcomes. These results suggest that people sensitive to principles engage deeply with dilemmas, 
carefully considering both the well-being of the sacrificial target and the group. Consistent with 
this interpretation, past work demonstrated similar heightened utilitarian and deontological 
responding among people high in markers of moral concern such as moral identity 
internalization (Conway et al., 2018; Reynolds & Conway, 2018), and when context promoted 
close and careful reading of dilemmas (Conway, Weiss, et al., 2018; Muda, et al., 2018).  
Importantly, these findings are inconsistent with theories suggesting that principledness 
uniquely increases deontological responding or reduces utilitarian responding. People sensitive 
to moral principles appear to balance multiple moral concerns rather then prioritizing only one. 
Research on sacrificial harm has long used philosophical labels to describe harm aversive and 
outcome-maximizing judgments. While such labels can be defended on pragmatic and scientific 
grounds (Conway et al, 2018), these labels might also tempt people to assume that deontological 
judgments may be driven primarily by moral principles, whereas utilitarian judgments may be 
determined by outcomes alone. Our data demonstrates that this assumption is inexact: 
participants who favor utilitarian judgments display equaly strong tendencies towards principled 
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moral judgments (as measured by their usage of the action, intention, and contact principle) as 
those who favor deontological judgments do. 
There might be practical implications to these findings as well. During the COVID-19 
pandemic, problems of sacrificial harm became a matter of public debate. In the initial months of 
the global vaccination drive, evidence arose that certain vaccines could trigger a rare blood 
clotting issue. Although preliminary evidence suggested that these side effects were rare and less 
common than comparable side-effects from COVID-19 infection (Taquet et al., 2021), several 
countries nonetheless suspended useage of these vaccines. As these decisions were anti-
utilitarian, they were widely critiqued. However, harms from COVID-19 are harms of omission, 
whereas harms by vaccination are harms of commission. This complicates the relative 
comparison of these harms. The current work suggests that people sensitive to the 
omission/commission distinction may not devalue utilitarian considerations and may even 
experience heightened utilitarian concerns, which they struggle to balance against heightened 
deontological concerns. Accordingly, even when utilitarian calculus clearly suggests one 
possible policy response, it remains important for public health officials to weigh other moral 
concerns as well. Proposed solutions may find broader public support if they explicate concern 
for both utilitarian and deontological considerations (see Rom et al., 2017).  
 
Limitations  
 Like all work, the current studies have limitations. First, the current work was conducted 
in Europe and North-America, thereby only including ‘WEIRD’ participants (Henrich et al., 
2010). There are cross-cultural differences in the extent to which people embrace certain moral 
principles such as the action principle (Awad et al., 2020). Accordingly, we caution against 
SENSITIVITY TO MORAL PRINCIPLES  22 
 
extrapolating the current results beyond their specific cultural context. Second, while the 
demonstrated associations are theoretically meaningful, the effects we have uncovered are small 
to medium-sized. Sensitivity to these principles appears to only be modestly related to 
preferences for deontological or utilitarian resolutions. Third, like most sacrificial dilemma 
research, we employed dilemmas that are hypothetical (Bauman et al., 2014), not always 
plausible (Körner, et al., 2019), and with questionable real-world predictive validity (Bostyn, et 
al., 2018). However, such dilemmas do remain useful for clarifying the cognitive structure of 
moral psychology (Cushman & Greene, 2012). 
Finally, like most sacrificial dilemma research, we examined dilemmas where utilitarian 
decisions necessitate action and deontological decisions necessitate inaction. Some authors have 
argued that this action/inaction distinction confounds concern for a focal target with a general 
unwillingness to act (Gawronski & Beer, 2017; Gawronski et al., 2017). Accordingly, these 
authors argue in favor of explicitly incorporating action/inaction tendencies as a third 
independent moral concern at the same level as response tendencies toward harm aversive or 
outcome-maximizing judgment. It remains unclear whether the current findings would be 
reproduced using such a model. Importantly, recent work using this model largely corroborates 
our argument that moral concern entails balancing multiple considerations: for example, people 
high in moral identity score high on all three parameters, demonstrating not only concern for 
harm aversion and outcomes, but also inaction (Körner et al., 2020). Hence, an exciting question 
for future work would be whether people sensitive to moral principles balance multiple moral 
considerations in these models. However, it is important to note that these models are contested 
as well. Other researchers have argued that the action/inaction distinction intrinsically typifies 
deontological judgment, where action that harms others are strictly forbidden and actions that aid 
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others are merely lauditory (Baron & Goodwin, 2020) and thus, that it is theoretically flawed to 
envision action/inaction tendencies as a separate dimension. This debate is not yet settled and 
readers are cautioned to take this issue into advisement when interpreting our results. 
 
Conclusion 
The current research demonstrates that individual differences in sensitivity to moral 
principles are associated with a balanced approach to concerns for individual victims and the 
larger group in sacrificial moral dilemmas. Hence, such individual differences could help refine 
insight into moral cognition. Whereas most moral psychology research has focused on either 
studying participants’ overall dilemma decision-making, or on subtle effects of each moral 
principle, these data demonstrate the added value of combining both perspectives.  
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